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        **E-Filed 1/24/2013** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
 
STEPHANIE LENZ, 
 
                                    Plaintiff, 
 
                           v. 
 
UNIVERSAL MUSIC CORPORATION, 
UNIVERSAL MUSIC PUBLISHING, INC. 
AND UNIVERSAL MUSIC PUBLISHING 
GROUP, 
 
                                    Defendants. 
 
Case No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF  
 
ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
[re: dkt. entries 390, 395] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Plaintiff Stephanie Lenz (“Lenz”) and Defendants Universal Music Corporation, Universal 
Music Publishing, Inc., and Universal Music Publishing Group (collectively, “Universal”) each 
move for summary judgment.  The Court has considered the briefing, the admissible evidence, and 
the oral argument presented at the hearing on October 16, 2012.  For the reasons discussed below, 
the motions will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The facts giving rise to this action are undisputed except as noted otherwise.  On February 7, 
2007, Lenz videotaped her young children in her family’s kitchen.  The song “Let’s Go Crazy” by 
the artist known as “Prince” played in the background.  During the video, Lenz’s son is shown 
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walking with the aid of a push-toy and “dancing” to the song.  Lenz can be heard asking, “what do 
you think of the music?”  On February 8, 2007, Lenz uploaded the twenty-nine second video to 
YouTube.com (“YouTube”), a popular Internet video hosting site.  She titled the video “Let’s Go 
Crazy #1.” 
 Universal is a music publishing company that administers composition copyrights for 
hundreds of songwriters.  In 2007, Universal administered copyrights for Prince.  Universal 
monitored YouTube regularly for unauthorized use of Prince’s works.  Universal’s head of business 
affairs, Robert Allen (“Allen”), assigned the task of monitoring YouTube to Sean Johnson 
(“Johnson”).  Johnson entered the titles of the most popular Prince songs into the YouTube search 
field, reviewing each returned video to determine whether it used one or more of the songs in an 
unauthorized or infringing manner.  If it did, Johnson included the video on a removal list.  The 
removal lists subsequently were sent to YouTube with a request that the identified videos be 
removed from the YouTube site. 
 After reviewing Lenz’s video, Johnson included it on the then-current removal list.  Allen 
instructed another Universal employee, Alina Moffat (“Moffat”), to transmit the list to YouTube via 
email.  On June 4, 2007, Moffat incorporated the list into a standard email format that Universal 
used when requesting that YouTube remove videos that Universal considered infringing.  She sent 
the email (hereinafter “Takedown Notice”) to copyright@youtube.com, an email address identified 
in YouTube’s Terms of Service as intended solely for the purpose of receiving notifications of 
claimed infringement under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 On June 4, 2007, YouTube sent Lenz an email notifying her that it had removed her “Let’s 
Go Crazy #1” video in response to Universal’s accusation of copyright infringement.  YouTube 
advised Lenz of the DMCA counter-notification procedures and warned her that repeated incidents 
of copyright infringement could lead to the deletion of her account and all of her posted videos.  On 
June 7, 2007, Lenz sent YouTube a DMCA counter-notice.  Because that counter-notice did not 
contain all of the elements required under 17 U.S.C. § 512(g), YouTube did not restore the video to 
its website at that time.  Lenz then retained counsel, who helped her send YouTube a second DMCA 
counter-notice on June 27, 2007.  That counter-notice asserted that the video constituted fair use of 
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“Let’s Go Crazy.”  YouTube restored the video to its site in mid-July 2007.  The video was down 
for approximately six weeks.  As of the date of this order, the video has been viewed on YouTube 
more than 1.2 million times. 
 Lenz filed the present action against Universal in July 2007.  Her operative second amended 
complaint asserts a single claim for misrepresentation pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).  Both she and 
Universal seek summary judgment with respect to that claim. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 A motion for summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).  The moving party bears 
the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions 
of “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 
materials” that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1)(A); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party meets 
this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.  A genuine issue for trial exists if the 
non-moving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor.  Anderson, 477 U.S. 
242, 248-49; Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 The DMCA limits service providers’ liability “for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).  This “safe harbor” provision 
applies if the service provider meets certain requirements and, upon receiving a “notification of 
claimed infringement,” “responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).  To 
be effective, a notification of claimed infringement sent to the service provider must include inter 
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alia “[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the 
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”  17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added).  “Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this 
section . . . that material or activity is infringing” may be liable for resulting damages incurred by 
the alleged infringer.  17 U.S.C. § 512(f).  To be recoverable, the damages must be “incurred by the 
alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider 
relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity 
claimed to be infringing.”  Id.  Lenz claims that Universal’s Takedown Notice was a “notification of 
claimed infringement” pursuant to the DMCA, that it constituted a knowing, material 
misrepresentation that her video infringed Prince’s copyright, and that she incurred damages as a 
result of YouTube’s removal of her video from its site. 
A. Applicability of the DMCA        
 As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the DMCA applies at all in this case.  As 
noted above, the DMCA imposes liability upon “[a]ny person who knowingly materially 
misrepresents under this section . . . that material or activity is infringing.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(f) 
(emphasis added).  Lenz asserts that Universal’s Takedown Notice was a “notification of claimed 
infringement” under § 512 and thus that any material misrepresentations contained therein were 
made “under this section,” that is, under the DMCA.  Universal contends that its Takedown Notice 
did not constitute a “notification of claimed infringement” under § 512 and thus that any 
misrepresentations contained therein cannot give rise to DMCA liability. 
 As relevant here, YouTube’s Terms of Use required that DMCA procedures be used to 
request removal of videos from YouTube.1  Dkt. Entry 398, Miksch Decl., Ex. N (Terms of Use), § 
8.  The Terms of Use summarized the DMCA’s provisions governing notification of copyright 
infringement and stated that such notifications should be sent to YouTube’s designated Copyright 
Agent.  Id.  The Copyright Agent’s email address was given as:  copyright@youtube.com.  Id.  
                                                 
1 Although Universal later entered into a contract with YouTube that granted Universal contractual 
rights with respect to removal of videos, Universal did not have any such contractual rights at the 
time that it sent the Takedown Notice.  Dkt. Entry 456, Miksch Decl., Ex. FF (Universal-YouTube 
contract effective June 28, 2007); Ex. Q2 (Allen Depo) at 72:4-13. 
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Notably, the Terms of Use stated that only DMCA notices should be sent to the Copyright Agent, 
and that any other communications should be directed to YouTube customer service through 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube.  Id.   
 Universal does not dispute that its Takedown Notice complied with these provisions and was 
sent to the email address designated for receipt of DMCA notifications of copyright infringement.  
However, it asserts that its Takedown Notice complied with YouTube’s Terms of Use – and thus 
with the DMCA – only because YouTube required such compliance.  Universal points out that the 
Takedown Notice also contained the following language: 
 
This email does not constitute a waiver of any right to recover damages incurred by 
virtue of any such unauthorized activities, and such rights as well as claims for other 
relief are expressly retained.  In addition, our use of YouTube’s required notice form 
does not indicate we believe that the above referenced copyright infringement is 
within the scope of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).  Our use of 
this form, as required by YouTube, is meant to facilitate YouTube’s removal of the 
infringing material listed above and is not meant to suggest or imply that YouTube’s 
activities and services are within the scope of the DMCA safe harbor. 
   
Dkt. Entry 398, Miksch Decl., Ex. P. (Takedown Notice of June 4, 2007) (emphasis added).  Allen, 
who ultimately was responsible for Universal’s notices to YouTube, testified that he did not believe 
that the Takedown Notice was sent pursuant to the DMCA.  Dkt. Entry 449, Klaus Decl., Ex. 3 
(Allen Depo.) at 78:2-15.   
 Universal appears to be arguing that it invoked the DMCA process only because YouTube’s 
Terms of Use required that the process be utilized to request removal of allegedly infringing content, 
and that because it expressly reserved its rights, the request was not made “pursuant” to the DMCA.  
Universal does not explain why it could not have addressed its concerns with YouTube’s Terms of 
Use directly with YouTube as provided in the Terms of Use themselves, nor does it point to any 
authority suggesting that its subjective intent is relevant to the legal adequacy of the Takedown 
Notice for purposes of the statute. 
 Universal also argues that YouTube is ineligible for the protection of the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provision.  Specifically, Universal contends that YouTube’s activities in uploading, hosting, 
and transmitting videos do not constitute “storage at the direction of the user” as specified in § 
512(c)(1).  Universal acknowledges that the Second Circuit has held to the contrary in Viacom Int’l, 
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Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).  In Viacom, the court concluded that YouTube’s 
conversion of videos into a standard display format, playback of videos on “watch” pages, and 
“related videos” function are encompassed within the term “storage at the direction of the user” as 
used in § 512(c)(1).  Id. at 38-39.  Universal also acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit has rejected a 
similar § 512(c)(1) challenge asserted by Universal in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital 
Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011).  See id. at 1031-35.  However, Universal notes that a 
petition for rehearing en banc in UMG Recording remains pending and that the parties have been 
directed to submit briefing on the impact of Viacom in connection with that petition.  Universal 
suggests that this Court delay resolution of the present cross-motions pending further action by the 
Ninth Circuit. 
 Lenz contends that UMG Recordings has no bearing on the present dispute because 
YouTube was not a defendant in that case and that this Court simply should apply Viacom.  While it 
is not clear that UMG Recordings is irrelevant to the present litigation, the Court is not inclined to 
stay resolution of the present motions, particularly given the lengthy pendency of this litigation, 
based upon the mere possibility that Universal’s petition for rehearing en banc might be granted.  In 
light of the record evidence and the current state of the law, the Court concludes that YouTube 
qualifies for protection under the DMCA safe harbor and that Universal’s Takedown Notice 
constituted a “notification of claimed infringement” under the DMCA. 
B. Material Misrepresentation 
 As discussed above, a notification of claimed infringement sent to a service provider under § 
512(c) must include inter alia “[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that 
use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, 
or the law.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).  Universal’s Takedown Notice stated as follows: 
 
We believe your service is hosting the above-referenced files on its network.  These 
files are offering video recordings in an interactive streaming format that embody 
musical compositions written by the artist known as Prince.  We have a good faith 
belief that the above-described activity is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law. 
Dkt. Entry 398, Miksch Decl., Ex. P. (Takedown Notice of June 4, 2007) (emphasis added).  Lenz 
asserts that this statement was a knowing, material misrepresentation under § 512(f) because, given 
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its procedures for reviewing videos before requesting that they be removed, Universal could not 
have formed a good faith belief that Lenz’s video did not constitute fair use. 
 1. Fair Use Doctrine 
 This Court held early in the present litigation that a copyright owner must consider fair use 
before proceeding with a takedown notice under the DMCA: 
 
[I]n order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with “a good faith 
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law,” the owner must evaluate whether the material 
makes fair use of the copyright.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).  An allegation that a 
copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper 
consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation 
claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA. 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154-55 (N.D. Cal. 2008).2   
 Lenz presents substantial evidence that Universal did not consider explicitly whether her 
video made fair use of Prince’s song before it sent the Takedown Notice.  Johnson, the only person 
at Universal who reviewed YouTube videos for violations of Prince’s copyrights, described his 
practice as follows:  “I put a video on the list that embodied a Prince composition in some way if the 
– there was a significant use of it, of the composition, specifically if the song was recognizable, was 
in a significant portion of the video or was the focus of the video.  Dkt. Entry 452, Miksch Decl., 
Ex. R (Johnson Depo.) 60:17-22.  He did not put a video on the list if it had only “a second or less 
of a Prince song, literally a one line, half line of a Prince song,” or if it was shot in a noisy 
environment like a bar where the song was playing “deep in the background.”  Id. at 62:4-10, 63:3-
15.  Johnson’s decision to put Lenz’s video on the removal list was based upon the facts that:  it was 
titled “Let’s Go Crazy #1”; he recognized the song in the background “right off the bat”; the song 
was loud and played through the entire video; and the audio track included a voice asking the 
                                                 
2 Universal claims that in light of the Ninth Circuit’s recent discussion of fair use in Monge v. Maya 
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012), the question of whether a particular use is 
“authorized by law” does not involve consideration of the fair use doctrine.  Addressing fair use in a 
case in which the doctrine was asserted as an affirmative defense, Monge held that, “This 
affirmative defense presumes that unauthorized copying has occurred, and is instead aimed at 
whether the defendant’s use was fair.”  Id. at 1170.  Universal argues that if the fair use doctrine 
does not come into play unless a use is “unauthorized,” then by definition fair use cannot be an 
“authorized” use for purposes of the DMCA.  However, while it does provide some support for 
Universal’s position, Monge is not a DMCA case, and it does not address the unique statutory 
language at issue here.  
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children whether they liked the music.  Id. at 75:16-76:7, 79:7-20.  Johnson made no mention of fair 
use during his testimony and gave no indication that he considered fair use before deciding whether 
to place Lenz’s video on the removal list.  Id.  
 The guidelines that Allen described when testifying on behalf of Universal likewise make no 
mention of fair use: 
 
The general guidelines are that when a writer is upset or requests that particular 
videos be removed from YouTube that we review the video to ensure that the 
composition was the focus of the video and if it was we then notify YouTube that the 
video should be removed. 
 
Dkt. Entry 452, Miksch Decl., Ex. Q (Allen Depo.) at 61:1-6.  In its supplemental response to 
Lenz’s requests for admission, Universal admitted that as of June 4, 2007 – the date of the 
Takedown Notice – it had not instructed Johnson to consider fair use during his review of YouTube 
videos.  Dkt. Entry 398, Miksch Decl., Ex. H (Supp. Resp. to RFAs) at 18.   
 This evidence is sufficient to establish that Universal issued its Takedown Notice without 
considering fair use.  Universal nonetheless contends that although Johnson was not instructed to 
and did not consider fair use per se, he did consider a number of factors that would be relevant to a 
fair use determination.  In general, such factors include:  (1) whether there was a transformative 
noncommercial purpose; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the use of the copyrighted work; and (4) the effect on the market for the copyrighted work.  17 
U.S.C. § 107.  Johnson testified that he considered whether Lenz’s video made “significant use” of 
Prince’s song and whether the song was the “focus” of the video.  See Dkt. Entry 452, Miksch Decl., 
Ex. R (Johnson Depo.) 60:17-22.  Universal argues that Johnson’s consideration of these and other 
factors relevant to a fair use analysis is sufficient to meet a requirement that a copyright owner 
consider fair use before proceeding under the DMCA.  Citing the Ninth Circuit’s recent statement 
that “[t]he fair use doctrine has been called the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,” 
Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), Universal argues that 
requiring anything more would be inconsistent with the relatively uncomplicated review process 
envisioned by this Court, see Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.   
 While it agrees that requiring a copyright holder to engage in a full-blown fair use analysis 
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prior to sending a DMCA takedown notice would be inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the 
statute, the Court disagrees that it is sufficient for a copyright holder to consider facts that might be 
relevant to a fair use analysis without making any effort to evaluate the significance of such facts in 
the context of the doctrine itself.  Because the question of whether something constitutes fair use is a 
“legal judgment,” Monge, 688 F.3d at 1183, proper consideration of the doctrine must include at 
least some analysis of the legal import of the facts.  The Court concludes that at minimum, for the 
reasons discussed at length in its prior order, see Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-56, a copyright 
owner must make at least an initial assessment as to whether the fair use doctrine applies to the use 
in question in order to make a good faith representation that the use is not “authorized by law.” 
 2. Effect Of Universal’s Failure To Consider Fair Use Doctrine 
 Lenz asserts that under the law of the case, Universal’s admitted failure to consider fair use 
before sending its Takedown Notice is sufficient to establish liability under § 512(f).  Universal 
disputes this assertion, relying upon the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rossi v. Motion Picture Assoc. of 
America, Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).  In Rossi, the court held that “the ‘good faith belief’ 
requirement in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompasses a subjective, rather than objective, standard.”  Id. at 
1004.  The plaintiff in that case asserted that had the defendant conducted a reasonable investigation 
into the plaintiff’s allegedly offending website, the defendant necessarily would have realized that 
there was no copyright infringement.  Id. at 1003.  The Court of Appeals concluded that “[a] 
copyright owner cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the 
copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.”  Id. at 1005.  “Rather, there must be a 
demonstration of some actual knowledge of misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner.”  
Id.  In light of Rossi, it appears that Universal’s mere failure to consider fair use would be 
insufficient to give rise to liability under § 512(f).  Lenz thus must demonstrate that Universal had 
some actual knowledge that its Takedown Notice contained a material misrepresentation. 
 This Court’s prior order contemplated imposition of § 512(f) liability upon a showing that 
the copyright owner “acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration 
of the fair use doctrine.”  Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.  A bad faith requirement would be 
consistent with Rossi’s subjective standard.  However, Lenz points out that neither the DMCA nor 
Case5:07-cv-03783-JF   Document459   Filed01/24/13   Page9 of 14
 10 
Case No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF 
ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
the applicable case law uses the term “bad faith.”  Instead, both frame the inquiry in terms of 
whether the party that issued the takedown notice had a “good faith belief” that use of the 
copyrighted work was unauthorized.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (providing that a notification 
of claimed infringement sent to the service provider must include “[a] statement that the 
complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not 
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”) (emphasis added); Rossi, 391 F.3d at 
1004 (discussing the “good faith belief” requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)).  Lenz contends that 
Universal could not have formed a good faith belief that her use of Prince’s song was not fair use 
because Universal’s takedown procedures ignored the question of fair use entirely. 
 Essentially, Lenz asserts that Universal’s procedures for evaluating copyright infringement 
were so deficient that Universal willfully blinded itself as to whether any given video might 
constitute fair use.  “Willful blindness is tantamount to knowledge.”  Viacom, 676 F.3d at 34; see 
also Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Willful blindness is knowledge, 
in copyright law . . . as it is in the law generally.”).  She argues that a showing of willful blindness 
would be sufficient to show an absence of good faith under Rossi’s subjective standard.3 
 In order to establish willful blindness on the part of a defendant, a plaintiff must establish 
two factors:  “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact 
exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”  Global 
Tech. Appliances, Inc. v. SEB SA, 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).  “Under this formulation, a willfully 
blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of 
wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.”  Id. at 2070-71.  
 Addressing the second factor first, Lenz presents evidence, discussed above, that Universal 
                                                 
3 At the hearing, Lenz’s counsel suggested that something less than willful blindness might be 
sufficient, arguing that the Rossi standard could be met simply by showing that on this record 
Universal could not have formed a good faith belief that fair use did not apply, because Universal 
did not consider fair use at all.  However, as noted above, an inadvertent failure to consider fair use 
would be insufficient to impose § 512 liability in light of Rossi.  Lenz must demonstrate “some 
actual knowledge of misrepresentation” on the part of Universal.  Since the record is devoid of 
evidence that Universal subjectively believed that fair use might apply to Lenz’s video, the Court 
concludes that the only other avenue available to Lenz is to show that Universal willfully blinded 
itself to the potential application of the fair use doctrine. 
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assigned the task of reviewing YouTube postings for infringing uses of Prince’s songs to a single 
person who was not given any information or training about fair use.  A trier of fact could conclude 
based on this evidence that Universal took deliberate actions to avoid learning whether any 
particular use of one of Prince’s works was protected by the fair use doctrine.     
 However, Lenz does not present evidence suggesting that Universal subjectively believed 
either that there was a high probability that any given video might make fair use of a Prince 
composition or that her video in particular made fair use of Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy.”  Lenz 
argues that her video was “self-evident” fair use and that Universal must have known it constituted 
fair use when it sent the Takedown Notice.  However, as the Ninth Circuit recently has observed, the 
process of making a fair use determination “is neither a mechanistic exercise nor a gestalt 
undertaking, but a considered legal judgment.”  Monge, 688 F.3d at 1183.   A legal conclusion that 
fair use was “self-evident” necessarily would rest upon an objective measure rather than the 
subjective standard required by Rossi.  Indeed, Universal presents evidence that Lenz herself 
initially did not view her claim as involving fair use.  See Dkt. Entry 400, Klaus Decl., Ex. 1 (Lenz’s 
Blog).4   
 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lenz is not entitled to summary judgment based on 
the theory that Universal willfully blinded itself to the possibility that her video constituted fair use 
of Prince’s song.  Nor is Universal entitled to summary judgment, as it has not shown that it lacked 
a subjective belief that there was a high probability that any given video might make fair use of a 
Prince composition.  Lenz is free to argue that a reasonable actor in Universal’s position would have 
understood that fair use was “self-evident,” and that this circumstance is evidence of Universal’s 
alleged willful blindness.  Universal likewise is free to argue that whatever the alleged shortcomings 
of its review process might have been, it did not act with the subjective intent required by §512(f). 
   
                                                 
4 Plaintiff objects to Universal’s citation to this evidence, asserting that the relevant inquiry is what 
Universal believed, not what Lenz or anyone else believed.  This objection is overruled.  Plaintiff’s 
initial impression that fair use did not apply in this case is relevant to her assertion that fair use is so 
“self-evident” that Universal must have known that the doctrine does apply. 
 
Case5:07-cv-03783-JF   Document459   Filed01/24/13   Page11 of 14
 12 
Case No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF 
ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
C. Damages   
 Universal contends that even if its Takedown Notice did contain a material 
misrepresentation sufficient to give rise to liability under the DMCA, it nonetheless is entitled to 
summary judgment because Lenz cannot demonstrate that she suffered any damages.  Lenz asserts 
that this Court already has held that she was damaged by YouTube’s removal of her video.  In its 
order dated February 25, 2010, the Court granted partial summary judgment with respect to a 
number of Universal’s affirmative defenses, including Universal’s third affirmative defense 
asserting that Lenz had not suffered any damages.  The Court reasoned as follows: 
 
Universal has challenged Lenz’s claim that her pre-suit activities, which included 
“time spent reviewing counternotice procedures, seeking the assistance of counsel, 
and responding to the takedown notice,” (Pl.’s MSJ), involved actual expense or 
economic loss. 
 
Universal does not claim that Lenz did not take these actions or incur any damages in 
doing so.  As discussed above, the Court concludes that actual expenses or economic 
losses of some minimum value are not necessary under the statute.  Accordingly, 
because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lenz incurred some 
damages as defined under the statute, Lenz’s motion will be granted as to Universal’s 
affirmative defense of no damages. 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2010 WL 702466, at *11-13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010).   
 Universal correctly points out that the record is more developed now than it was at the time 
the Court issued its prior order, and that Lenz’s damages theory has evolved over time.  Universal 
argues that on the current record the Court may conclude as a matter of law that Lenz did not incur 
any damages recoverable under § 512. 
 Lenz asserts three categories of damages:  loss of YouTube’s hosting services and chilling of 
her free speech, lost time and resources, and attorneys’ fees and costs.  With respect to the first 
category, Universal submits evidence that YouTube services were available to Lenz at no cost and 
that Lenz did not care that YouTube declined to host her video.  See Dkt. Entry 400, Klaus Decl., 
Ex. 3 (email) (“I don’t care that YouTube doesn’t want to host it.  Not like I’m paying them.”).  
Lenz states in her declaration that as a result of the takedown of her video, she recorded videos of 
her children less frequently, and felt that her freedom to express herself through video had been 
restricted.  Dkt. Entry 392, Lenz Decl., ¶ 10.  She seeks nominal damages for the chilling of her free 
speech rights.  However, the cases upon which she relies raised challenges to government action.  
Case5:07-cv-03783-JF   Document459   Filed01/24/13   Page12 of 14
 13 
Case No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF 
ORDER DENYING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
For example, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), involved a suit by a state employee against the state.  
The plaintiff was awarded nominal damages.5  Lenz invites this Court to extend the reach of such 
cases to the conduct of private actors in the DMCA context.  However, absent some authority 
supporting such an extension, the Court declines the invitation.  Accordingly, the Court concludes 
that Lenz cannot demonstrate damages based upon the loss of YouTube’s hosting services and the 
chilling of her free speech.   
 Lenz claims that, “In total, I spent at least ten hours before filing this lawsuit on obtaining 
counsel, figuring out how to send – and sending – the first counternotice to YouTube, sending the 
second counternotice to YouTube, and ensuring that my video was restored to YouTube.”  Dkt. 
Entry 392, Lenz Decl., ¶ 9.  She requests that she be compensated for that time at minimum wage, 
although she admittedly did not lose any actual wages.  She goes on to state that, “Most, if not all, of 
this work was completed on my personal computer.”   
 Apparently there is no reported case that indicates definitively whether Lenz may recover for 
the time and resources that she herself expended in attempting to have her video reinstated under the 
DMCA’s counter-notice procedures.  Universal argues that Lenz may not recover damages for her 
expenditure of her own time and resources, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 525, 549 
(1977), for the proposition that pecuniary loss is an element of a claim for misrepresentation. 
However, it is not clear that the pecuniary loss requirement applies to a statutory claim brought 
under the DMCA.  Lenz must have incurred at least minimal expenses for electricity to power her 
computer, internet and telephone bills, and the like, that potentially could be recoverable under § 
512(f).  Permitting recovery of such damages would be consistent with this Court’s earlier 
conclusion that “[t]he use of ‘any damages’ [in the statute] suggests strongly Congressional intent 
that recovery be available for damages even if they do not amount to . . . substantial economic 
damages.”  Lenz, 2010 WL 702466, at *10.  As the Court has noted, requiring a plaintiff who has 
                                                 
5 The holding in another case relied upon by Lenz, Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 738 F. 
Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2010), was reversed and vacated after briefing on the present 
motions was completed, see 697 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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demonstrated a misrepresentation actionable under the DMCA “to demonstrate in addition not only 
that she suffered damages but also that those damages were economic and substantial would vitiate 
the deterrent effect of the statute.”  Id.     
 Finally, Lenz claims that she incurred attorneys’ fees for pre-litigation work done in 
responding to the Takedown Notice.  Attorney Marcia Hoffman states in her declaration that she 
works for the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), that she spent 4.25 hours helping Lenz 
respond to the Takedown Notice prior to commencement of litigation, and that at her normal billing 
rate the fees incurred total $1,275.  Dkt. Entry 393, Hoffman Decl., ¶¶ 1-7.  While those fees were 
pro bono, it is not clear that they cannot form the basis of a damages claim here.  Lenz points to 
language in her retainer agreement with EFF requiring her to assign any recovery up to the full 
amount of the EFF’s fees and expenses.  Dkt. Entry 446, Klaus Decl., Ex. 34 (Retainer Agreement).  
It may be that Lenz may recover the pro bono fees as an element of damages if she prevails on her 
DMCA claim.  The cases cited by the parties are not dispositive on this issue.6  
 In summary, the Court concludes that Universal has not established that Lenz is precluded 
from recovering any damages for her DMCA claim.  This ruling is without prejudice to a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, if and when such motion is 
appropriate.   
IV. ORDER 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED. 
 
DATED:  1/24/2013 
       _________________________ 
       JEREMY FOGEL 
       United States District Judge 
                                                 
6 Universal argues that counsel’s prelitigation work was so intertwined with the litigation that the 
fees are not recoverable under the Court’s prior ruling that fees incurred for litigation are not 
recoverable.  See Lenz, 2010 WL 702466, at *11.  Universal does not cite authority holding that 
“intertwined” fees are not recoverable, and the Court is not prepared to conclude on this record that 
in fact the prelitigation and post litigation fees are so intertwined that the former would be 
unrecoverable under the Court’s prior ruling. 
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